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DISTRICT COURT JUDGE PRESIDING

MARY C. CORPORON #734
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
310 South Main Street
Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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THOMAS R. BLONQUIST #0369
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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COURT OF APPEALS

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND
OTHER AUTHORITIES
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, cases, or
other authorities cited by defendant in this brief, or thought by
defendant to be dispositive of the issues in this appeal.
such authorities are referenced
herein.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STEVEN MARK HANSEN,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

REPLY BRIEF

-vs-

Lower Court Civil No. 920902292
Case No. 93 0121 CA

TONY DONNELLY,

Priority Classification 14b

Defendant/Appellant.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT (hereinafter "defendant")
and submits the following as his Reply Brief in the above-captioned
case:

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The plaintiff's brief misrepresents the nature of the

court orders appealed from.
2.

Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof by failing

to establish through clear and convincing evidence that defendant
was in contempt of court.
3.

The court's order was too ambiguous to be enforceable.

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

PLAINTIFF MISREPRESENTS THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL
COURT-

Plaintiff makes much in his Brief of Appellee of the issue of
defendant's physical distance from plaintiff on May 25, 1992, and
June 21 and 22, 1992. To the extent that plaintiff is attempting
to represent that defendant's physical proximity to plaintiff was
at all relevant, this is a mischaracterization of the lower court's
orders.
The trial court did enjoin defendant from being within 200
feet of the
employed.11

"premises where the Plaintiff may reside or be

It also enjoined defendant from being "within 50 feet

of the Plaintiff . . . "

However, all these restrictions were

contained within the April 23, 1992, Temporary Restraining Order.
That order expired, by its own terms, ten days later, on May 3,
1992.

Thereafter, by its own language, that order became void.
Plaintiff reports that the trial court admonished defendant

at the hearing on May 1, 1992, to keep a certain distance from the
plaintiff.

This assertion is not supported by the record.

The

court specifically declined to restrict defendant to keep a set
distance from plaintiff, while defendant was at or in his own home.
The court specifically stated, at the hearing when defendant was
found in contempt:
And the request was made that I limit Mr.
Donnelly so that he could not be within 50

2

feet of Mr. Hansen when he came to pick up
his child. And the request was made, Judge,
if you do that, it's going to require that he
go out and stand in the back corner of his
lot somewhere if you impose that kind of
restriction. And so the Court decided not to
impose that restriction, but just order that
he act reasonably. (R. 211, 11.23-212, 1.5)
(emphasis added)
Most importantly, plaintiff's characterization of the oral
ruling is in direct contradiction to the language of the lower
court's order entered June 5, 1992.

The language of that order

(which is the order defendant allegedly violated in May and June,
1992) says absolutely

nothing

about defendant keeping a set

distance from plaintiff or his property. This order was drafted by
plaintiff's own counsel.

Certainly, if the court had really

ordered defendant to keep a set distance away from plaintiff,
plaintiff's own counsel would have reflected that in the written
order he prepared.
Thus, plaintiff's assertion in his Brief of Appellee that
defendant violated the June 5, 1992 order, solely by standing
eighteen inches to two feet from defendant, is not valid.

After

the first restraining order expired on May 3, 1992, it simply did
not matter how close defendant stood to plaintiff.
Everything else plaintiff complained of at trial was of a
highly subjective nature. For example, plaintiff complained in his
testimony (and in his brief) that defendant "glared" or "stared" at
plaintiff, or threatened plaintiff by "body language."
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Given

plaintiffs clear hostility toward defendant, his interpretation
that defendant "glared" rather than just "looked" at plaintiff, or
that his "body language" was "threatening," is not credible.

His

testimony on this point is not adequate to sustain plaintiff's
burden of proof to support his claim of contempt by clear and
convincing evidence.

POINT II:

THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER WAS AMBIGUOUS.

Plaintiff does not address in his Brief of Appellee the issue
of the ambiguity of the June 5, 1992 order.

The order to "act

reasonably" was too ambiguous to be enforceable in a contempt
action.
Plaintiff's brief supports defendant's claim that the order
to "act reasonably" is too subjective to be enforceable. Plaintiff
quotes the judge's own comment made at trial when the judge found
defendant in contempt.

The court stated:

I'm going to find that the defendant is in contempt
of this Court's orders now, and admittedly, Paragraph 2,
plaintiff and defendant are ordered to act reasonably in
the presence of each other. That may be a subjective
determination. (R. 214) (emphasis added)
The court goes on to decline to order a jail sentence for
defendant, based upon lack of notice given by the earlier court
order.
As pointed out in plaintiff's own brief, the court felt the
order was open to subjective interpretation.
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The court itself

found the notice to defendant, of what was required of him, to be
so inadequate that a jail sentence could not be justified.
For the very reason a jail term was improper, a finding of
contempt was also improper.

CONCLUSION
The trial court could not find, as a matter of law, that
defendant had knowledge of the specific duty imposed upon him by
the trial court, or the

ability

to comply with the order.

Therefore, as a matter of law, the trial court could not find
defendant in contempt.
Since the court below could not find defendant to be in
contempt, the court could not fine defendant $100.00 for contempt,
nor assess defendant $1,000.00, for plaintiff's attorney's fee, as
an additional sanction for contempt.
The case should be remanded for reversal of the order of
contempt, and of the order for sanctions, including the fine and
attorney's fees.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of April, 1993
CORPORON & WILLIAMS

MARY C. CORPORON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon
& Williams, attorneys for the defendant/appellant herein, and that
I

caused

the

foregoing

REPLY

BRIEF

to

be

served

upon

plaintiff/respondent by placing two true and correct copies of the
same in an envelope addressed to:
THOMAS BLONQUIST
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
40 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage pre-paid
thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the
day of

, 1993.

Secretary
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